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INTRODUCTION 
Since the nineteenth century, adoption has been used in the United 
States to create legally recognized parent–child relationships between 
consenting adults.1  While adult adoption has grown in prevalence in the 
United States,2 some Americans are either unaware of its availability or 
 
*  J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2011; B.A., Emory University, 2006.  I would like 
to thank the members of the Northwestern University Law Review Board for their helpful comments and 
suggestions throughout the writing process. Thank you also to my advisor, Professor Helene Shapo, for 
her guidance and insight in the early stages of this Comment.  Finally, a special thanks to my friends and 
family for their love and support. 
1  See, e.g., In re Wright’s Estate, 155 Pa. 64, 65 (1893) (referencing a provision of the Act of May 
9, 1889, which “authorized the adoption of adults, as children and heirs, with the consent and approval 
of the persons so adopted and of the proper court”). 
2  See Terry L. Turnipseed, Scalia’s Ship of Revulsion Has Sailed: Will Lawrence Protect Adults 
Who Adopt Lovers To Help Ensure Their Inheritance from Incest Prosecution?, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 
95, 95 (2009) (recognizing the “growing trend” of adult adoption in the United States). 
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underestimate its use in our legal system.  In reality, there are several 
reasons why an adult would choose to adopt another adult, and the practice 
is not at all uncommon.3 
This Comment explores adult adoption and the corresponding rights 
afforded to adult adoptees under the intestate succession and class gift 
provisions of the Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”).4  The Comment assesses 
the advantages and disadvantages of adopting the UPC’s suggested 
provisions and proposes a modification to the UPC that treats adult 
adoptees consistently in both the class gift and intestacy contexts: as natural 
children for transfers directly from adoptive parents but not for transfers 
from third parties.  As discussed below, such a statutory framework is both 
consistent with the principles of estate law and is sound public policy. 
The motivations behind an adult adoption are often numerous and 
include the recognition of familial ties, enjoyment of employment benefits, 
and establishment of inheritance rights.5  For these reasons, adult adoption 
has been used by same-sex couples to obtain some of the rights denied to 
them by the unavailability of marriage.6  This Comment seeks a happy 
medium that ensures the protection of the important benefits that lie outside 
of the inheritance realm, while avoiding the potential manipulation of estate 
law.  It concludes that adult adoption petitions should be broadly granted, 
with legislatures resolving intestacy and class gift issues through clear and 
comprehensive inheritance statutes. 
Part II of this Comment explores the history and rationale behind adult 
adoption and assesses its statutory availability across states.  Part III 
explains the treatment of adult adoptees under UPC sections 2-155 and 
2-705 and determines that while the UPC provision on class gifts is 
consistent with decedent intent and social policy, the intestacy provision 
falls short. 
Part IV proposes a statutory scheme that adopts the UPC class gift 
provision, but modifies the UPC intestacy section to limit inheritance by an 
adult adoptee through an adoptive parent to those situations where a parent–
child relationship exists.  Part IV also suggests a reciprocal beneficiary 
program as a way for states to allow parties to preserve inheritance rights 
without resorting to adult adoption. 
 
3  Unfortunately no data are available regarding the number of adult adoption petitions in each state.  
However, adult adoption has been acknowledged as enjoying “widespread recognition within our legal 
system,” and “not an uncommon occurrence.”  Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and 
Association: Who Should Get What and Why (The Impact of Adoptions, Adult Adoptions, and Equitable 
Adoptions on Intestate Succession and Class Gifts), 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 749 (1984).  One now-dated 
estimate by “knowledgeable practitioners” put the number of successful adult adoption petitions in 
California at around two to three hundred per year.  See Peter N. Fowler, Comment, Adult Adoption: A 
“New” Legal Tool for Lesbians and Gay Men, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 667, 702 (1984). 
4  UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-115, 2-705 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 50–51, 141–42 (Supp. 2011). 
5  See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 3, at 679–88. 
6  See, e.g., id. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. History of Adoption 
Historically, adoption’s primary uses were to perpetuate familial 
lineage and designate heirs to fulfill religious obligations.7  The intended 
beneficiary of the adoption was the adopter rather than the adoptee.8  When 
adoption first emerged in the United States, it was an informal process used 
to relieve the government of a ward and provide an economic benefit to the 
adoptive parents.9  The state of the adoptive home was not a consideration, 
and the children were often used as cheap labor.10  It was not until the 
nineteenth century that the primary concern in minor adoptions shifted from 
the adopter’s potential benefits to the best interests of the child.11 
Adoption did not exist under English common law and its formal 
acceptance and regulation in the United States has been exclusively by 
statute.12  In the mid-nineteenth century, general adoption legislation was 
introduced as part of the growing call for social welfare reform.13  While 
some of the enacted statutes provided for the adoption of “children,”14 
several state legislatures also enacted separate provisions for the adoption of 
adults.15  At the same time, the broad and ambiguous language of the 
general adoption provisions in other states was interpreted to extend to 
adoptees of any age.16 
 
7  Rein, supra note 3, at 714. 
8  See Walter Wadlington, Adoption of Adults: A Family Law Anomaly, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 566, 
567 (1969). 
9  See Rein, supra note 3, at 714–15. 
10  See Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues, and Laws 1958–1983, 17 FAM. L.Q. 173, 
176 (1983). 
11  See Rein, supra note 3, at 716–17. 
12  Leo Albert Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743, 747 (1956); 
Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 
443 (1971). 
13  Rein, supra note 3, at 716–17.  The increase in immigration and rise in poverty associated with 
the industrial revolution caused a corresponding rise in the number of destitute children, which 
highlighted the inadequacies of the limited and informal adoption process in existence.  Housing the 
children that were displaced became a focus of Christian philanthropy and led to our current adoption 
system.  Id. 
14  Wadlington, supra note 8, at 569.  Massachusetts is believed to be the first state to ratify an 
adoption statute, in 1851.  Id.  The Act provided for the adoption of “children,” which was interpreted to 
limit its application to minors only.  Id. 
15  Id.  Within twenty years of enacting its general adoption provision, Massachusetts enacted a 
specific provision for adult adoption that stated: “A person of adult age may be adopted in like manner 
upon his own consent, without other consent or notice.”  1871 Mass. Acts 654.  Vermont also endorsed 
adult adoption as early as 1853.  See 1853 Vt. Acts & Resolves 42–43. 
16  See Note, Adult Adoption, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 253, 255 (1972). 
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B. Why Adopt an Adult? 
While adult adoption gained recognition at around the same time as 
minor adoption, the rationales for its use were (and remain) largely 
different.  Similar to minor adoption, adult adoption is implemented to 
formalize a family unit.17  This is often the motivation behind the adoption 
of foster and stepchildren who were raised by the adoptive parent and 
developed a parent–child bond but had not yet legally solidified that 
relationship.18  The parties may fail to undertake an adoption when the 
adoptee is a minor because of legal obstacles,19 or an earlier adoption may 
be invalidated because of a procedural defect.20  After reaching adulthood, 
the child may also want to carry on the family name or give recognition to 
her de facto parent.21 
Additionally, adult adoption is sometimes used in an attempt to 
circumvent various laws and regulations or to ensure the extension of 
benefits to the adoptee.22  One illustrative example is Coker v. Celebrezze, 
in which a grandparent adopted his twenty-three-year-old disabled 
grandchild in order to secure insurance and disability benefits under the 
Social Security Act.23  Similarly, in 333 E. 53rd Street Associates v. Mann, 
two elderly roommates used adult adoption to circumvent state eviction 
laws.24 
 
17  See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 3, at 686–88. 
18  See, e.g., St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 76 S.W.2d 685, 686, 689 (Mo. 1934) (upholding the 
adoption of Hill’s two stepchildren, ages twenty-two and twenty-eight). 
19  This issue often arises when the biological parent refuses to consent to the adoption.  See, e.g., In 
re Estate of Joseph, 949 P.2d 472, 480–81 (Cal. 1998) (explaining that the natural parents’ refusal to 
consent was a legal barrier to adoption by the foster parent while the child was a minor, but the 
impediment was lifted when the child reached the age of maturity). 
20  Several states have annulment statutes that provides for the revocation of a final adoption decree 
within a specified time period if the decree is procedurally defective.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 8-123 (2011) (allowing one year for procedural attacks on adoption decrees); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-
5-214 (2010) (allowing ninety days for procedural attacks on final decrees, extended to one year for 
stepparent adoptions); D.C. CODE § 16-310 (2011) (allowing one year for procedural attacks on 
adoption decrees); see also Note, When Love Is Not Enough: Toward a Unified Wrongful Adoption Tort, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 1761, 1766–67 (1992). 
21  See In re Adoption of Miller, 227 So. 2d 73, 74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (stating that the 
adoptee wanted to be legally recognized as the adopters’ son because he felt the adopters were his only 
real family, he had used their surname since high school, and they felt a mutual affection as members of 
a family unit). 
22  See, e.g., Wadlington, supra note 8, at 577. 
23  241 F. Supp. 783, 783–85 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).  The Social Security Act required that the 
beneficiary be the wage earner’s child, adopted child, or stepchild.  Id. at 784.  Though the adoption 
itself was approved, the claim for benefits was denied by the government on the ground that Tennessee 
law did not allow for the adoption of an individual over the age of twenty-one.  Id.  The District Court, 
however, disagreed with the government and reinstated the benefits on the grounds of legislative intent.  
Id. at 786–87. 
24  503 N.Y.S.2d 752, 753 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).  Jerri Blanchard, the adopter, was a rent-
controlled tenant in an apartment building that was subsequently converted to cooperative ownership.  
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Increasingly, however, adult adoption is prompted by inheritance 
objectives.25  On questions of inheritance, the law generally treats adopted 
children in the same manner as natural children.26  A growing number of 
people take advantage of this principle of estate law through adult adoption, 
which brings the adoptee into the purview of intestate succession and may 
even qualify him as a class gift beneficiary.27 
In all fifty states, if an individual dies intestate (i.e., without a legal 
will) and is survived only by an adopted child, the adopted child becomes 
the sole inheritor of the individual’s estate.28  This severs the inheritance 
rights of all other biological relatives, such as the decedent’s siblings and 
parents.29  Additionally, by becoming the adoptive parent’s heir, the adoptee 
may be entitled to inherit through the adopter via intestate succession.30  For 
example, if the adopter dies before a relative from whom he would inherit, 
and the relative then dies intestate, the adoptee could inherit his adoptive 
parent’s share by representation. 
This issue was addressed in Harper v. Martin.31  In Harper, a 
terminally ill petitioner adopted a forty-seven-year-old male for the sole 
purpose of qualifying him as an heir to her incompetent relative who lacked 
a will.32  The trial court held that the adoptee did not constitute an heir on 
the ground that the relative was too incompetent to make a will and 
therefore did not have the opportunity to disinherit him.33  The appellate 
court reversed, however, finding that the relative did not have any plan for 
 
Id.  Helen Mann, the adoptee, was Blanchard’s roommate who lived with Blanchard since before the 
conversion.  Id.  In order to secure Mann’s tenancy after Blanchard died, Blanchard legally adopted 
Mann so that she fell within the New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations.  Id. at 753–54 (“No 
occupant of housing accommodations shall be evicted under this section where the occupant is either the 
surviving spouse of the deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased tenant’s family who has 
been living with the tenant.” (quoting N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2104.6(d))). 
25  See, e.g., In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095, 1098 (Del. 1993) (“Cases upholding 
adoptions for the purpose of improving the adoptee’s inheritance rights continue to grow.”). 
26  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5 cmt. d 
(1999); 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 175 (2011); Brynne E. McCabe, Note, Adult Adoption: The Varying 
Motives, Potential Consequences, and Ethical Considerations, 22 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 300, 301 
(2009). 
27  See Rein, supra note 3, 749–51. 
28  See generally Turnipseed, supra note 2, at 99–106 (providing background information on 
intestate succession in the United States). 
29  See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 
253 (1981). 
30  See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 101 (8th ed. 2009).  To 
inherit “through” someone means to acquire the right to inherit that the person would have had if he 
were living or able to inherit.  This is different than inheriting “from” someone, which entitles an 
individual to a portion of the person’s estate, but does not allow the individual to continue to inherit 
from other estates on that person’s behalf. 
31  552 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). 
32  Id. at 692. 
33  Id. 
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disposition that would be “thwarted” by recognizing the adoptee’s 
inheritance rights.34 
In cases where an adoptive parent dies with a will, the recognition of 
the adoptee as the adoptive parent’s descendant ensures that natural parents 
and collateral relatives35 are barred from challenging the will’s legality.36  
The only individuals with standing to contest a will are those who stand to 
inherit if the will is invalidated.37  By removing their ability to take by 
intestacy, the adoption revokes the standing of other relatives to challenge 
the will’s validity.38  A notorious example is Greene v. Fitzpatrick, in which 
a wealthy, unmarried attorney adopted his married mistress in order to 
secure her inheritance rights and prevent any challenge by his biological 
relatives.39  Justice Holmes acknowledged this effect of adoption, noting 
that adoption for the purpose of “tak[ing] away any inducement that some 
of those who otherwise would have been his heirs might have to oppose his 
will” was “perfectly proper.”40 
More controversial than intestate succession is the use of adult 
adoption to include the adoptee within class gifts in will and trust 
dispositions.41  In designating beneficiaries, a testator or settler of a trust 
may provide for distribution to such classes as “children,” “issue,” or 
“descendants.”42  Generally, the language used in defining the class43 and 
 
34  Id. 
35  In the context of estate law, collaterals are relatives outside of the direct line of ascent or descent.  
Collaterals include such relatives as siblings, cousins, aunts, and uncles.  See, e.g., ROGER W. 
ANDERSEN & IRA MARK BLOOM, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES 43 (3d ed. 2007). 
36  See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 30, at 102–03. 
37  See, e.g., id. 
38  See id.  This is not to say that blood relatives are denied all methods of attack.  They may still be 
able to challenge the actual adoption decree on grounds of mental incapacity or undue influence.  See, 
e.g., Wilson v. Caulfield, 67 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934) (allowing a challenge to adoption on 
fraud and undue influence grounds).  If the adoption is set aside, the relatives regain standing to 
challenge the will because their intestacy rights are reinstated.  See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 
30, at 102–03.  However, the adoption still offers an additional line of defense against the invalidation of 
the will and provides a strong indication of testamentary intent.  See id. at 103.  
39  295 S.W. 896, 897 (Ky. 1927).  It is important to note, however, that the court did allow the 
relatives to challenge the actual adoption, as opposed to the will, on fraud and undue influence grounds.  
See id. at 899; see also Wilson, 67 S.W.2d at 764 (providing an example of an adoption being challenged 
on fraud and undue influence grounds). 
40  Collamore v. Learned, 50 N.E. 518, 519 (Mass. 1898). 
41  See Rein, supra note 3, at 755 (raising the argument that in class gift situations, as opposed to 
intestate succession, it is more likely that the adoption will have occurred long after the donor’s death, 
making manipulation more plausible). 
42  See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 30, at 103. 
43  See Note, supra note 16, at 265–66 (noting that some courts have held such designations as 
“issue” and “heirs of the body” to require blood relationships and “children” to exclude adults, but have 
interpreted “heirs” more broadly). 
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the statutes in effect at the time of execution44 are considered as factors 
when determining whether the adult adoptee falls within the beneficiary 
class.45  Several courts have interpreted adult adoptees to fall within these 
classes in the same manner as minor adoptees.46  The designations of “heirs” 
and “heirs at law” in particular have been subject to a technical 
interpretation that does away with the requirement of a blood relationship 
and includes both minor and adult adoptees.47 
In In re Estate of Fortney,48 the court took such a broad approach in 
interpreting a class gift.  John Fortney’s parents, the testators, formulated 
their will so that all of their property would go to John and his sister, and 
then to their children.49  If John and his sister died without heirs, the 
remainder would go to the testators’ siblings’ children.50  After John’s sister 
passed away without any children, John, who was ninety years old and 
childless, adopted his wife’s sixty-five-year-old nephew.51  Over the 
objection of John’s cousins, the court held that the property transferred to 
the adult adoptee at John’s death.52  Looking to the Kentucky probate code, 
the court held that “an adopted adult falls within the definition of ‘child’ as 
contemplated by that statute.”53  Though the original will was executed 
sixteen years before adult adoption even became legal in Kansas, the court 
reasoned that the testator must be presumed “to know the legislature might 
change both the age of majority and the limitation that only minors could be 
adopted.”54 
If an adult adoptee qualifies for inclusion in such a class, the associated 
rights go beyond even those inheritance rights provided by marriage.55  
Such a result has not gone unnoticed by savvy estate planners.  In Bedinger 
v. Graybill’s Executor & Trustee, the Kentucky Court of Appeals (then the 
 
44  See Abramovic v. Brunken, 94 Cal. Rptr. 303, 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (denying inclusion of 
adult adoptee as “issue” on grounds that at the time of execution, issue was defined as a blood relation 
and adult adoption had not been legalized); First Nat’l Bank of Kan. City v. Sullivan, 394 S.W.2d 273, 
281 (Mo. 1965) (“[The court’s interpretation] is in accordance with the general rule that whether an 
adopted child is embraced within the meaning of a described class of beneficiaries in a will is governed 
by the law in force at the time the will or other instrument was executed.”). 
45  Note, supra note 16, at 264. 
46  See id. at 264–65. 
47  See id. at 263–65; see also Brock v. Dorman, 98 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Mo. 1936) (allowing inclusion 
of adult adoptee in a class gift to “heirs,” and noting that the term “heir” is “broader and more inclusive” 
than “children” or “heirs of the body”). 
48  611 P.2d 599 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980). 
49  Id. at 601. 
50  Id. 
51  Id. at 600–01. 
52  Id. at 605. 
53  Id. at 604. 
54  Id. at 603. 
55  See McCabe, supra note 26, at 301. 
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state’s highest court) upheld the adoption of a forty-five-year-old wife by 
her fifty-eight-year-old husband.56  The primary purpose of the adoption 
was to secure the wife’s entitlement to a trust established by her mother-in-
law, which went to the husband during his life with the remainder to his 
heirs at law.57  If the husband died without any heirs, the trust would be 
divided between two charities.58  The adoption made his wife his heir at law 
and thus the beneficiary of the trust upon his death.59  The court upheld the 
adoption and thus the inheritance since adult adoption was clearly lawful 
and adopted children were included within the designation of an heir under 
Kentucky law.60 
Finally, another, though admittedly weaker, financial reason for adult 
adoption is the potential for reduced inheritance taxes.  In some states, 
inheritance tax rates are lower for property transfers that flow to a lineal 
heir as opposed to someone unrelated or less directly related to the decedent 
in the disposition of an estate.61  In In re Adoption of Swanson, the Supreme 
Court of Delaware acknowledged this benefit, stating that one reason for the 
adult adoption at issue was to “obtain the reduced inheritance tax rate which 
natural and adopted children enjoy under Delaware law.”62 
C. Adult Adoption by Same-Sex Couples 
Because of the numerous advantages of adult adoption, it is used by 
same-sex couples seeking benefits denied to them because they are unable 
to legally marry.  Adult adoption by same-sex couples may be implemented 
for a combination of reasons, such as recognizing family units, establishing 
intestate succession, or ensuring the extension of benefits.63  While this 
seems like a tempting tool for same-sex couples and may in fact be the best 
available option for an individual couple, it also carries several 
disadvantages. 
1. The benefits of marriage: A comparison to adult  
adoption.—Marriage includes a multitude of benefits that are not 
 
56  302 S.W.2d 594, 596, 600 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957). 
57  Id. at 596. 
58  Id. 
59  Id. at 600. 
60  Id. at 598–99. 
61  See Turnipseed, supra note 2, at 105. 
62  In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095, 1096 (Del. 1993) (involving the adoption of a fifty-
one-year-old man by his sixty-six-year-old companion).  This benefit is no longer as significant a 
motivation for adult adoption, however, since the large majority of states have done away with their 
inheritance tax.  See Turnipseed, supra note 2, at 105 n.59 (citing Taxes by State, RETIREMENT LIVING 
INFO. CENTER (Jan. 2011), http://www.retirementliving.com/RLtaxes.html).  Even Delaware, noted 
above, has since replaced its inheritance tax with an estate tax that does not examine the relationship to 
the receiving parties of the property.  See id. (citing 71 Del. Laws 902 (1999)). 
63  See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 3, at 679–88. 
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otherwise available to unmarried couples.64  By denying gay and lesbian 
couples the right to marry, federal and state legislatures block the primary 
route to the couples’ recognition of those benefits.65  Though the definition 
of family has broadened and become more flexible in today’s society, 
courts, legislatures, and government decisionmakers have continued to 
show reluctance toward recognizing same-sex marriage.66  In light of this 
hesitation, adult adoption has become an imperfect alternative for many 
same-sex couples. 
Possibly the most significant benefit that marriage provides is the legal 
and formal recognition of a family unit.  As an expression of commitment, 
marriage is said to promote the societal goal of family stability.67  In this 
respect, adult adoption does a fair job of simulating the marital relationship 
by formally and publically acknowledging a direct family tie between 
adopter and adoptee. 
Additionally, many beneficiary privileges are established within the 
framework of familial status based on marriage or biological ties.  Access to 
insurance policies, employee benefits, and retirement funds may be equally 
important to the same-sex couples that wish to marry as it is to the married 
couples to whom the benefits apply.68  Worker’s compensation schemes 
often function the same way, with benefits only provided to qualified 
“dependents” of the employee.69  In this context, adult adoption creates the 
family relationship that is generally needed to become a beneficiary, thus 
conferring the same rights as would a marriage.70 
Finally, same-sex couples use adult adoption largely to secure the 
intestate succession created by marriage.71  Under intestacy laws, the estate 
of a decedent, or at least a portion of that estate, first passes to the surviving 
 
64  See Adam Chase, Tax Planning for Same-Sex Couples, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 359, 359 (1995) 
(referencing the “panoply of entitlements and privileges that come as part of the institution of 
marriage”). 
65  It is true that all unmarried couples are denied the benefits of the institution of marriage, but the 
impact on same-sex couples is particularly severe because they are not afforded the option to enter into a 
marital relationship.  See Developments in the Law—Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 1508, 1604 (1989) [hereinafter Sexual Orientation and the Law]. 
66  See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504–06 (1977) (broadening the legal definition 
of family beyond the nuclear family to include one’s extended family); see also Sexual Orientation and 
the Law, supra note 65, at 1604 (noting the changing modern family, often headed by a single parent or 
by two working parents). 
67  See Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 65, at 1607. 
68  See Turnipseed, supra note 2, at 105–06. 
69  See Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 65, at 1618–19. 
70  Although in the insurance context a policyholder may designate whomever he wishes as a 
beneficiary, the insurance company may require factual evidence of a close relationship between the 
insured and the proposed beneficiary.  See Fowler, supra note 3, at 682–83.  Through adult adoption, the 
couple can avoid or minimize the ability of other potential heirs to attack the designation of a 
beneficiary on undue influence grounds.  See id. 
71  See id. at 679–80. 
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spouse.72  For example, under UPC section 2-102, the entire intestate estate 
passes to the surviving spouse if there is no surviving parent or descendant, 
or if any descendants are also descendants of the surviving spouse.73  In any 
other context, a minimum of $150,000 still transfers first to the surviving 
spouse.74  By creating a legal relationship through adult adoption, same-sex 
couples may be able to ensure similar intestacy rights.75 
2. The disadvantages of adult adoption for same-sex  
couples.—Despite the benefits of adult adoption, same-sex couples 
have been wary of using it as a legal tool.76  While it confers rights similar 
to those that marriage creates, it also entails many disadvantages that do not 
arise in the marital context.  Probably the most widespread criticism of 
adult adoption for same-sex couples is its irrevocability.77  If the intimate 
relationship between the couple ends, there is no mechanism comparable to 
divorce to sever the legal bond.78  Because the legal relationship remains, 
even an attempt to disinherit the adoptee may prove futile since the adoptee 
will have standing to contest the will.79  Additionally, the adoptee may 
continue to qualify as a class member in gifts by third parties to the heirs of 
the adoptive parent.80 
The strong push to create a permanent family unit through adoption 
also has the added repercussion of affecting the partners’ inheritance rights 
beyond their immediate relationship.  In most states, the adoptee loses his 
right to inherit from his biological parents when the new parent-child 
relationship is created via adoption.81  If the intimate relationship ends, the 
adoptee cannot restore his right to inherit from his natural parents.82 
 
72  See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 30, at 75–76. 
73  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 36–37 (Supp. 2011). 
74  Id. 
75  As the main thrust of this Comment, the intestacy succession laws surrounding adult adoption and 
its implications for same-sex couples in particular will be discussed in more detail infra Part III. 
76  See Gwendolyn L. Snodgrass, Note, Creating Family Without Marriage: The Advantages and 
Disadvantages of Adult Adoption Among Gay and Lesbian Partners, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 75, 75 
(1997). 
77  See id. at 83 (identifying its irrevocability as adult adoption’s “most negative characteristic”). 
78  See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 30, at 107. 
79  See, e.g., Snodgrass, supra note 76, at 83–84; see also supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text 
(discussing the effect of adult adoption on standing to contest a will). 
80  This issue was highlighted by the famous case of billionaire tobacco heiress Doris Duke, who 
adopted thirty-five-year-old Chandi Heffner.  See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 30, at 107–08.  Doris 
and Chandi later had a falling out, and Doris wished to exclude Chandi from taking as her heir.  Id. at 
107.  Specifically, Doris’s father had established two trusts that named Doris’s children as remainders.  
Id.  Though Doris was explicit in her will that she did not intend for Chandi to be treated as her child, 
Chandi sued and received a $60 million settlement from the trusts and $5 million from Doris’s estate.  
Id. at 107–08. 
81  See Fowler, supra note 3, at 681.  In response to this, same-sex couples should consider which 
partner stands to inherit the most and which partner is likely to outlive the other.  Chase, supra note 64, 
at 387–88.  Additionally, couples should consider the fact that an adoptee can still inherit from his 
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Socially, adult adoption may subject the parties to the scorn of friends 
and family.  Unlike marriage, outsiders may view the adoptive relationship 
as undermining social roles and perverting the parent–child relationship.83  
This can take a psychological toll on the partners both individually and as a 
couple.84  Additionally, the imposition of a parent–child relationship may 
have a psychological impact on the parties by destabilizing the idea that the 
relationship is one based on equality, since it formally changes the positions 
of the parties in relation to each other.85 
Finally, sexually intimate partners who establish a parent–child 
relationship through adult adoption run the risk of being prosecuted for 
incest.  Though it is uncertain how often this happens in practice, the incest 
statutes of many states are broad enough to include sexual relations between 
a parent and an adult adopted child.86  While incest statutes are narrowly 
construed such that they will not act as a legal bar to the actual adoption of 
one’s lover, the subsequent relationship that is established may open up the 
couple to criminal prosecution.87  Such criminalization has been criticized 
on constitutional grounds post-Lawrence v. Texas,88 but for now, the risk 
remains a consideration of same-sex couples looking to legally recognize 
their relationship. 
Because of these drawbacks, couples have been cautious in their use of 
adult adoption as a stand-in for marriage.89  However, with the 
unavailability of same-sex marriage in almost all jurisdictions,90 adult 
adoption is still a valid option to secure certain benefits that are otherwise 
inaccessible.  Given its continued use, it is helpful to next examine the law 
surrounding the availability of adult adoption. 
 
biological parents by will.  Snodgrass, supra note 76, at 84.  If one partner’s relatives are more 
supportive of the relationship, it may be beneficial for that partner to sever the legally recognized 
familial ties and instead establish his inheritance rights by will. 
82  Snodgrass, supra note 76, at 84. 
83  See id. 
84  See id. 
85  See Fowler, supra note 3, at 707. 
86  Turnipseed, supra note 2, at 98.  Currently, states are split as to whether the adoption of a lover 
falls within the reach of incest statutes.  See id. at 121–23 (noting that at least twenty-five states have 
laws, either statutory or common law, that place the adoptive relationship between an adopted parent 
and adult child within the reach of incest). 
87  Snodgrass, supra note 76, at 85. 
88  539 U.S. 558 (2003); see Turnipseed, supra note 2, at 132 (concluding that Lawrence’s protection 
of personal sexual privacy should be extended to protect against criminalization of same-sex couples 
who choose to adopt). 
89  See Snodgrass, supra note 76, at 75. 
90  See Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (July 14, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16430 (citing only seven states 
and the District of Columbia as issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples). 
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D. The Law Surrounding Adult Adoption 
As noted previously, adoption in the United States exists purely as a 
creature of statute.91  Most states allow one adult to adopt another, subject to 
certain statutory requirements and limitations.92  In courts that grant adult 
adoptions, most take the position that a court has a duty to recognize adult 
adoptions if the statute allows it.  Other courts, however, inject their own 
interpretations into the statutes, reading in requirements and limitations that 
they argue are necessary to remain consistent with public policy.93  This 
section provides an overview of the relevant state statutory requirements.  It 
also addresses the actual adoption process and how adult adoption may 
differ from minor adoption. 
1. Statutory Restrictions.—Currently, several states have statutorily 
defined restrictions or prohibitions on the adoption of adults.94  In many, the 
restriction is an age requirement.95  In New Jersey, for example, adult 
adoption is allowed with a minimum ten-year age gap,96 and in 
Massachusetts, Nevada, and Connecticut, state statutes allow for adult 
adoption as long as the adopted adult is younger than the adopter.97 
In addition, several statutes make some form of qualification based on 
the existing relationship between the parties, most commonly prohibiting 
adult adoption between spouses or siblings.98  The Uniform Adoption Act 
(UAA) states that “[a]n adult may adopt another adult . . . but an adult may 
not adopt his or her spouse.”99  Other states require the existence of a certain 
type of relationship before the parties can enter into an adult adoption.100  In 
Arizona, an adult adoptee must be a “stepchild, niece, nephew, cousin or 
 
91  See supra Part I.A. 
92  See Turnipseed, supra note 2, at 107–08. 
93  See McCabe, supra note 26, at 305–06. 
94  See, e.g., K. M. Potraker, Annotation, Adoption of Adult, 21 A.L.R. 3d 1012 (1968). 
95  See, e.g., id. 
96  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:22-2 (West 2011).  This requirement may be waived, however, if the court 
determines that the adoption would be in the best interests of the adoptee.  Id.  Similarly, Puerto Rico 
allows for the adoption of an adult as long as the adoptee is fourteen years younger than the adopter.  
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 531(4) (2009). 
97  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-734 (2011); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 1 (LexisNexis 2011); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 127.190 (2007). 
98  See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 1 (allowing the adoption of a younger adult “unless such other 
person is his or her wife or husband, or brother, sister, uncle or aunt, of the whole or half blood”); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-734 (using similar language to the Massachusetts statute). 
99  UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 5-101, 9 U.L.A. 113 (1994).  While the UAA has only been adopted in 
its entirety in Vermont, other states have adopted portions of the Act to supplement their existing 
adoption statutes.  See Carrie L. Wambaugh, Comment, Biology Is Important, but Does Not Necessarily 
Always Constitute a “Family”: A Brief Survey of the Uniform Adoption Act, 32 AKRON L. REV. 791, 
792 & n.8 (1999). 
100  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-8101 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.02(B)(3) (West 
2011). 
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grandchild of the adopting person.”101  Similarly, Ohio allows for the 
adoption of an adult primarily if the adoptee is disabled or mentally 
retarded, or the adopter acted as stepparent or foster-caregiver to the 
adoptee while she was a minor.102 
2. Judicial Considerations and the Process of Adopting an 
Adult.—Once the parties have ensured compliance with any 
relevant statutory requirements, the process of adopting an adult is usually 
relatively simple.  In fact, adopting an adult is often easier than adopting a 
minor, since many of the concerns in a minor adoption are no longer 
relevant.103  Some courts treat adult adoption as similar to a contractual 
agreement and routinely grant petitions presented by two competent 
adults.104  This is reflected in the UAA, which requires only the consent of 
the adoptee and adoptive parent for an adult adoption.105  Generally, giving 
notice to the biological parents and other blood relatives is not even 
required.106  This is one notable way in which the adult adoption process is 
more streamlined than that of minor adoption, which generally requires 
some form of consent by the biological parents.107 
Additionally, in minor adoptions the court traditionally looks to the 
best interests of the adoptee.108  When the proposed adoption is between two 
consenting adults, however, some courts refuse to substitute their own 
judgment of the parties’ “best interests” for that of the consenting adults.109 
Other courts choose to go beyond the plain language of the statute.  
Some consider the underlying motivation of the parties, looking to whether 
the purpose of the adoption is insincere, criminal, or fraudulent.110  Courts 
often recognize that an adult adoption for inheritance purposes is not itself 
fraudulent.111  Other courts look to the public policy implications of granting 
 
101  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-8101.  The provision also allows for adoption by a foster parent as 
long as the adoptee was placed in the adopter’s custody as a juvenile and the parties have maintained a 
familial relationship for at least five years.  Id. 
102  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.02(B). 
103  See McCabe, supra note 26, at 304. 
104  See Fowler, supra note 3, at 692.  In such cases, the only finding by the court is whether there is 
voluntary and mutual consent.  See id. 
105  UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 5-103, 9 U.L.A. 114 (1994).  The provision requires the parties’ consent 
to be in writing, and it must acknowledge their understanding of the consequences of the adoption, 
specifically as it relates to “inheritance, property, or support.”  Id. 
106  See Turnipseed, supra note 2, at 111. 
107  See McCabe, supra note 26, at 304; see also § 2-401, 9 U.L.A. 49–50 (requiring the consent of 
the child’s biological mother and the presumed father, or the minor’s guardian or current adoptive 
parent). 
108  McCabe, supra note 26, at 304. 
109  Fowler, supra note 3, at 694. 
110  See McCabe, supra note 26, at 305. 
111  See Potraker, supra note 94, § 8. 
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adult adoptions.112  Notably, New York courts have relied on public policy 
grounds to deny adult adoptions to homosexual couples.113  According to the 
state’s highest court, allowing the adoption of one’s lover would be “wholly 
inconsistent with the underlying public policy of providing a parent-child 
relationship,”114 and “the Legislature could not have intended that the statute 
be employed ‘to arrive at an unreasonable or absurd result.’”115 
Overall, the process of adopting an adult and the limitations imposed 
by the legislature and judiciary vary widely from state to state.116  The 
majority of states do, however, allow some form of adult adoption,117 which 
raises the issue of how such relationships should be treated in those states.  
The next section addresses the treatment of adult adoptees under the UPC 
provisions on intestate succession and class gifts and assesses the positive 
and negative attributes of the Code’s approach. 
II. ADULT ADOPTION, INTESTATE SUCCESSION, AND CLASS GIFTS 
As noted previously, adult adoption is often undertaken to secure the 
adoptee’s inheritance rights.118  This arises in the context of intestate 
succession, where the adoptee may stand to inherit from or through the 
adoptive parent under the intestacy laws adopted by the state.  Additionally, 
inheritance issues arise in relation to trust cases and class gifts, where the 
established legal relationship may result in the inclusion of the adoptee in 
such class designations as “heirs” and “descendants.”119  The UPC, which 
seeks to establish a model for the states, has weighed in on the treatment of 
adult adoptees in both contexts.  This section examines the relevant UPC 
provisions, compares them with current state statutes, and assesses whether 
they properly promote the principles of estate law and are consistent with 
sound public policy for the states. 
A. The Uniform Probate Code 
1. UPC Section 2-115.—In general, the UPC treats adopted children 
as natural children for intestacy purposes.  This is explained in Article II of 
the UPC, which includes the Code’s detailed provisions regarding intestacy, 
 
112  See McCabe, supra note 26, at 305–06. 
113  See In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424, 425–27 (N.Y. 1984). 
114  Id. at 425. 
115  Id. at 427 (quoting Williams v. Williams, 246 N.E.2d 333, 337 (N.Y. 1969)). 
116  See supra notes 94–115 and accompanying text (discussing the various statutory restrictions and 
judicial interpretations across the states). 
117  See Turnipseed, supra note 2, at 107–08; see also Adult Adoption Laws, ADOPTING.ORG, 
http://www.adopting.org/adoptions/adopting-an-adult-state-laws.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2011) 
(providing state-by-state summaries of adult adoption statutes). 
118  See supra Part I.B. 
119  See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 30, at 106. 
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wills, and donative transfers.120  Part 1 of Article II establishes the basic 
pattern of intestate succession to be applied in cases where there is no 
individualized estate plan.121  In section 2-118, the Code provides that a 
“parent-child relationship exists between an adoptee and the adoptee’s 
adoptive parent or parents.”122  The Code proceeds to define “adoptee” in 
section 2-115 as meaning “an individual who is adopted.”123 
The drafters explain in the comments to section 2-115 that “‘adoptee’ 
is not limited to an individual who is adopted as a minor but includes an 
individual who is adopted as an adult.”124  This statement explicitly resolves 
the issue posed by adult adoptees, clarifying that they are to be treated in 
the same vein as natural children for purposes of intestacy.  As section 
2-116 states, if a parent–child relationship exists, “the parent is a parent of 
the child and the child is a child of the parent for the purpose of intestate 
succession.”125  This means that, under the UPC, an adult adoptee may 
inherit directly as the heir of the adoptive parent and may also inherit 
through the adoptive parent as a descendant by representation. 
2. UPC Section 2-705.—The UPC’s general policy that adopted 
children are to be treated as the natural children of the adoptive parent is 
reflected in its treatment of class gifts.  In setting out the rules of 
construction to be applied to class gifts in wills and other governing 
instruments, section 2-705 specifically states that “‘[a]doptee’ has the 
meaning set forth in Section 2-115.”126  As discussed above, section 2-115 
defines adoptee as “an individual who is adopted.”127  Section 2-705 goes on 
to explain that “[a] class gift that uses a term of relationship to identify the 
class members includes . . . an adoptee . . . in accordance with the rules for 
intestate succession regarding parent-child relationships.”128  Thus, “except 
as otherwise provided in subsections (e) and (f),” an adoptee is to be 
included in any class that is founded on a parent–child relationship with the 
adoptive parent.129 
 
120  UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-102 to -122 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 36–66 (Supp. 2011). 
121  Id. at Art. II, pt. 1, general cmt., 8 U.L.A. 34–35 (stating that the intestate succession established 
under Part 1 “was designed to provide suitable rules for the person of modest means who relies on the 
estate plan provided by law”). 
122  Id. § 2-118(a), 8 U.L.A. 53. 
123  Id. § 2-115(1), 8 U.L.A. 50. 
124  Id. § 2-115 cmt., 8 U.L.A. 51–52 (emphasis added). 
125  Id. § 2-116, 8 U.L.A. 52. 
126  Id. § 2-705(a)(1), 8 U.L.A. 141. 
127  Id. § 2-115(1), 8 U.L.A. 50. 
128  Id. § 2-705(b), 8 U.L.A. 141. 
129  Id.  Subsection (e), which is outside the scope of this Comment, addresses inheritance as a child 
of a genetic parent when the genetic parent or his relatives did not function as a parent.  Id. § 2-705(e), 8 
U.L.A. 141. 
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However, the UPC takes a distinctly different approach to its treatment 
of adult adoptees in its class gift provisions than it does in the intestacy 
context.  As provided under subsection (f) under the heading “Transferor 
Not Adoptive Parent”: 
In construing a dispositive provision of a transferor who is not the adoptive 
parent, an adoptee is not considered the child of the adoptive parent unless: 
(1) the adoption took place before the adoptee reached [eighteen] years of 
age; 
(2) the adoptive parent was the adoptee’s stepparent or foster parent; or 
(3) the adoptive parent functioned as a parent of the adoptee before the 
adoptee reached [eighteen] years of age.130 
This means that, while an adult adoptee is freely included in a class gift 
from her adoptive parent, she is not included in the same class for purposes 
of transfers from persons other than the adoptive parent unless a bona fide 
parent-child relationship exists. 
To illustrate, suppose that A adopts X as an adult, and A is not X’s 
stepparent or foster parent and did not function as X’s parent while X was a 
minor.  If A dies testate, leaving his estate “to my children,” X takes a share 
in the estate since the transferor is the adoptive parent.  However, if a third 
party, such as A’s parent, dies and leaves his estate “to A’s children,” X is 
not entitled to share in the estate as part of that class.  Thus, an adult 
adoptee is included in class gifts when transferred from the adopting parent 
but not from a third party. 
B. State Statutes 
Some state legislation addresses intestacy and class gift issues within 
state adoption laws, specifically prohibiting adult adoptions motivated by 
inheritance objectives.131  Other states distinguish between adult and minor 
adoptees under state intestacy and class gift laws, as does the UPC.132  
However, a majority of states leave these questions open to the courts’ 
interpretation by not differentiating between adult and minor adoptees133 
and providing no guidance on the interpretation of class gift language. 
In situations where the statute fails to distinguish between adult and 
minor adoptees, courts generally presume that adult adoptees are intended 
to be treated in the same respect as minor adoptees.  Such an interpretation 
 
130  Id. § 2-705(f), 8 U.L.A. 141–42. 
131  See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-6 cmt. (2011) (“Adult adoptions for inheritance purposes provided for 
in . . . the Alabama Code [were] repealed.”).  The merits of such an approach are assessed in more detail 
infra Part III.B. 
132  See IND. CODE § 29-1-6-1(d) (2011). 
133  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 101(1) (2011) (defining “[c]hild” as “any individual entitled to 
take as a child under this title by intestate succession from the parent”). 
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was adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Chichester v. Wilmington 
Trust Co., where the court addressed whether two adult adoptees could 
inherit through their adoptive parent by right of representation.134  The 
majority referenced the portion of the adoption statute relating specifically 
to adult adoption, which stated that “all the duties, rights, privileges and 
obligations recognized by law between parent and child shall exist between 
the petitioner . . . and the person . . . adopted, as fully and to all intents and 
purposes as if such person . . . were the lawful and natural offspring or issue 
of the petitioner.”135  The court then applied this provision to the broad 
language in the probate code and held that the adult adoptees were included 
as beneficiaries of a trust as “issue” of their adoptive parent’s mother.136 
With regard to class gifts, some states have provisions similar to those 
of the UPC.137  In Indiana, for example, the court distinguishes between 
minor and adult adoptees, treating a minor adoptee as the natural child of 
the adoptive parent for all intents and purposes related to class gifts.138  With 
regard to adult adoptees, however, the statute states: “Any person adopted 
after the person’s twenty-first birthday by the testator shall be considered 
the child of the testator, but no other person shall be entitled to establish 
relationship to the testator through such child.”139 
C. Decedent’s Intent and Other Policy Considerations 
When analyzing the merits of these statutes it is important to focus on 
both the interests of the property owner and the interests of society as a 
whole.140  While it is true that, in practice, intestacy laws and rules of 
construction will not work equally well for each decedent, it should be the 
legislature’s objective to adopt a framework that is as consistent as possible 
with both the decedent’s intent and the relevant public policy objectives.141 
1. Interests of the Property Owner.—When someone dies without a 
will, one of the fundamental objectives is to dispose of the estate in the 
manner most likely to reflect the decedent’s wishes.142  This is done by 
estimating what the average decedent in the situation would have 
 
134  377 A.2d 11, 12 (Del. 1977). 
135  Id. at 13 n.1 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 954). 
136  Id. at 14. 
137  See IND. CODE § 29-1-6-1(d). 
138  Id. (“In construing a will making a devise to a person or persons described by relationship to the 
testator or to another, any person adopted prior to the person’s twenty-first birthday before the death of 
the testator shall be considered the child of the adopting parent . . . .”). 
139  Id. 
140  See Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 7 
(2000). 
141  See id. at 1–2. 
142  See Mark Glover, Formal Execution and Informal Revocation: Manifestations of Probate’s 
Family Protection Policy, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 411, 419 (2009). 
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intended.143  In every state, the law assumes that the decedent’s probable 
intent was to transfer property to the most proximate members of her 
family.144 
The preferential treatment of relatives in intestacy statutes stems in part 
from the strong tendency of testators to leave their estates to spouses and 
lineal descendants, providing evidence of the average decedent’s intent.145  
Additionally, there is a commonly held expectation that if one dies intestate, 
his property transfers to his next of kin.146  Roughly half the population dies 
without a will,147 which may be due at least in part to the assumption that 
their estate will transfer to proximate family members without the need for 
costly legal action.148  The goal of intestacy law is to meet this 
expectation.149 
When someone dies with a will, the goal remains the same: to give 
effect to the decedent’s intent.150  But unlike in intestacy situations, there is 
actual written evidence of the testator’s wishes.  This implicates the 
fundamental estate law principle of testamentary freedom, which is the 
belief that the testator has the right to dispose of her property as she 
wishes.151  The task then becomes one of construction: to interpret the 
instrument in the manner that most effectively protects this liberty and 
provides the intended interpretation of the language used.  This issue arises 
with class gifts, where the testator often uses such terms as “children,” 
“issue,” or “heirs.”  In these cases, the court is presented with the task of 
determining whether the testator intended to include the relevant individual 
in that gift. 
2. Interests of Society.—At the same time, it is important to look at 
the policy considerations implicated by adult adoptions, which can 
sometimes lie in tension with the likely intent of the donor.152  Though the 
 
143  Rein, supra note 3, at 732. 
144  See Glover, supra note 142, at 419. 
145  See id. (noting that scholarly surveys of probate records confirm that the “vast majority of 
testators distribute their estates within the family”). 
146  See id. at 420–21. 
147  DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 30, at 71. 
148  Cf. Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and 
Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 323–24 (arguing in 
support of the right not to execute a will so that one’s estate passes to his family in accordance with 
decedent intent). 
149  See Glover, supra note 142, at 419 (“The primary goal of intestacy is to distribute the estate in 
accordance with the decedent’s probable wishes; an intent the law assumes is to direct assets to 
surviving family members.”). 
150  See Rein, supra note 3, at 731–32. 
151  See Glover, supra note 142, at 422. 
152  See Rein, supra note 3, at 732–33. 
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power of testation does have legal limitations,153 the principle of 
testamentary freedom suggests that a clear indication of decedent intent 
generally supersedes any concern over reflecting community attitudes and 
meeting public expectations.154  However, in cases of intestacy, where there 
is no written will indicating the decedent’s wishes, and class gifts, where 
intent is often ambiguous, these concerns should play a larger role. 
One of the primary societal goals of estate law is to support and 
encourage healthy family units.155  Beyond just promoting succession within 
the family, estate law seeks to strengthen bonds and limit familial 
disputes.156  By favoring succession within the family, it ensures that the 
decedent’s dependents are provided for and gives incentive to care for and 
maintain relationships with adult family members.157 
Succession laws also have the ability to provide for the well-being of 
society as a whole.  The broader social considerations for legislatures to 
keep in mind include promoting social and legal stability, encouraging ease 
of administration, maintaining respect for the system, and preventing 
waste.158  Presumably, providing constancy within the law secures public 
expectations and encourages trust in the system. 
This is not to say that the law should not be responsive to changes in 
society, but rather that it should have clear parameters and be consistently 
applied.  For this reason, there is a societal interest in preventing the use of 
legal strategy to avoid and manipulate the rationales behind our laws.  Not 
only does such manipulation cut against the interests that the legislature is 
trying to promote, but it may serve to undermine the credibility of the 
system as a whole.  For example, parties using adult adoption solely for 
inheritance purposes are sometimes acting specifically to circumvent the 
decedent’s intent.  Yet, respecting the decedent’s intent is a fundamental 
tenet of estate law.159  Allowing inheritance in these cases disappoints public 
expectations and leads to inconsistency within the system.160 
 
153  John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 n.8 
(1975) (noting such limitations as taxation, forced share or other family protection legislation, and the 
rule against perpetuities). 
154  See id. at 491; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 10.1 & cmts. a–c (2003) (“The donor’s intention is given effect to the maximum extent 
allowed by law . . . .  American law does not grant courts any general authority to question the wisdom, 
fairness, or reasonableness of the donor’s decisions about how to allocate his or her property.”). 
155  See Gary, supra note 140, at 10. 
156  See id. 
157  See id. at 11–12. 
158  See John T. Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 497, 513–
16 (1977). 
159  See Gary, supra note 140, at 7–8. 
160  The court in Cross v. Cross endorsed this view, stating that to allow “[t]he adoption of an adult 
solely for the purpose of making him an heir of an ancestor under the terms of a testamentary instrument 
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D. Application: Intestate Succession and Class Gifts 
Applying these considerations to the adoption context, it is now 
generally accepted that adoptive children should be treated as natural 
children for purposes of intestate succession and class gifts.161  The 
requirement of a blood connection, historically a prerequisite for a parent–
child relationship in the intestacy and testacy context, has been largely 
disavowed as an outdated and underinclusive principle of estate law.162  This 
promotes the public policies in favor of adoption, which legally recognizes 
existing family bonds and promotes permanency within family units. 
For inheritance purposes, the most common practice is to fully 
incorporate the child into the adopting family.163  Not all states recognize 
the ability of an adopted child to inherit through the adoptive parent, though 
it has been argued that this is inconsistent with the societal policy of 
promoting the best interests of the adoptee by fully recognizing him as a 
family member.164  This policy, that an adopted child should be recognized 
as a full member of the adoptive family, supports the inclusion of all 
adoptees in intestacy statutes.  It is from this starting point that this 
Comment next considers decedent intent and societal interests in the 
treatment of adult adoptees under these provisions. 
1. Intestate Succession.—State laws customarily allow an adult 
adoptee to inherit directly from an adoptive parent if that parent dies 
intestate.165  This practice is also permissible under UPC section 2-116, 
given the definition of adoptee as including an adult adoptee under section 
 
known and in existence at the time of the adoption is an act of subterfuge.”  532 N.E.2d 486, 488–89 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
161  Most jurisdictions recognize full inheritance rights between the adoptee and the adoptive family.  
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5(2) & cmt. d (1999) 
(“Most intestacy statutes, including the Original and Revised UPC, treat an adopted child as a full 
member of the child’s adoptive family.”).  In terms of class gifts, adoptees are generally included in 
classes for gifts coming directly from the adoptive parent.  Rein, supra note 3, at 733.  A few courts 
have departed from this, but only in the context of avoiding dual inheritance.  Id.  When the donative 
instrument is executed by a third party (not the adoptee or adoptive parent), the courts previously 
applied the “stranger-to-the-adoption” rule, which served as a presumptive bar from including adopted 
children.  Id.  Today, however, courts have replaced this rule with a presumption that adoption includes 
the adoptee in the class unless the donor expressly excludes him.  Id. at 735. 
162  See Lee-ford Tritt, Sperms and Estates: An Unadulterated Functionally Based Approach to 
Parent-Child Property Succession, 62 SMU L. REV. 367, 368–69 (2009). 
163  See Gary, supra note 140, at 28. 
164  See Rein, supra note 3, at 720–22.  In South Dakota, for example, the state statute provides: 
“After adoption the [child and person adopting] shall sustain towards each other the legal relation of 
parent and child and have all the rights and be subject to all the duties of that relation.”  S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 25-6-16 (2011).  State courts have interpreted this language to mean that “[t]he contractual 
nature of adoption does not extend beyond the adoptive parents and the child.”  In re Estate of Edwards, 
273 N.W.2d 118, 120 (S.D. 1978). 
165  See Rein, supra note 3, at 755. 
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2-115.166  Historically, creating one’s own heir through adoption has almost 
always been accepted and the result is considered very clearly within the 
contemplation of the decedent.167  Though it has been argued that there is a 
tension between allowing this sort of designative freedom and promoting 
the societal interest in familial succession,168 the strong policies in favor of 
property rights and testamentary freedom overwhelmingly suggest that the 
decedent’s intent should be respected in this context. 
As discussed supra Part II.A.1, UPC sections 2-115 and 2-116 also 
place no limitations on an adult adoptee’s right to inherit through his 
adoptive parent.169  Whether this ability to inherit as a descendant by 
representation is consistent with the decedent’s intent is not nearly as clear 
as it is for transfers from the adoptive parent.  Unlike minor adoptions, the 
theoretical full integration of the adoptee into the adopting family is less 
likely to reflect reality, especially in cases where the relationship is not truly 
one of parent to child. 
There is a stronger probability in adult adoptions, as compared to 
minor adoptions, that relatives will not even be aware of the legal 
relationship, and, even if they are, they will presumably be less likely to 
consider the adoptee to be their grandson or niece or great-granddaughter.  
This is due in large part to the parties and motivations involved in adult 
adoptions, and the relative ease with which adult adoptions are obtained.170  
For example, with a homosexual couple, it is doubtful that the adopting 
partner’s parents would consider their child’s same-sex partner as their 
grandson.  This would be inconsistent with general conceptions of familial 
roles, diminishing the likelihood that there would be the expectation that 
their estate would transfer to him in his capacity as a grandchild. 
From an efficiency and policy perspective, disallowing the inheritance 
by adult adoptees through their adoptive parents would provide a bright-line 
rule that is simple to administer and likely to reflect the decedent’s intent.  
Some argue that in intestacy cases the adoption is likely to occur during the 
decedent’s lifetime, providing him with the opportunity to draft a will 
excluding the adoptee if he so desires.171  However if there is no 
requirement that the relatives be notified, a deceased relative of the adopter 
 
166  See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-115 to -116 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 50–52 (Supp. 2011). 
167  See Rein, supra note 3, at 755. 
168  See Gary, supra note 140, at 10.  This tension exists in the adult adoptee context under the 
assumption that the adoption recognized a relationship that was not actually one of parent–child.  By 
allowing the adult adoptee to inherit, this principle blocks the transfer to the true relatives of the 
decedent.  See, e.g., Rein, supra note 3, at 755. 
169  See §§ 2-115 to -116, 8 U.L.A. 50–52. 
170  See supra Part I.B (discussing the reasons one would adopt an adult); supra Part I.D.2 (noting 
that adult adoptees are not required to give notice to their relatives that might be affected). 
171  See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., The Rights of Adopted Children Under Class Gifts, 50 IOWA L. 
REV. 971, 988 (1965). 
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may not even be aware of the adoption.172  Setting a default rule prohibiting 
such inheritance will provide the relatives that do know about the adoption 
the opportunity to change their wills to include the adoptee if they so desire. 
It is true, however, that some adult adoptions are undertaken to 
recognize a parent–child relationship that has existed since the adoptee was 
a minor.173  In these cases, the policies that underlie the treatment of minor 
adoptees as natural children are also present.  Because of this, the 
legislature should provide an exception for such adult adoptees, allowing 
their inheritance as full-fledged members of the family.174 
The above analysis of public policy and decedent intent suggests that 
change is necessary both in section 2-115 of the UPC, which treats adopted 
children as natural children for intestacy purposes, and in those state 
statutes that are left open to interpretation regarding adult adoptees 
specifically.  As stated previously, many state courts that are given such 
discretion presume that the legislature’s intention was to treat minor and 
adult adoptees in the same manner.175  Since there are strong policy reasons 
for allowing minor adoptees to inherit through their adoptive parents that do 
not exist for all adult adoptees, the legislature should be clear about 
distinguishing between minors and adults. 
2. Class Gifts.—While section 2-115 may lead to unfavorable results, 
the UPC more effectively addresses the specific concerns that arise with 
adult adoptions in its class gift provision, section 2-705.176  In analyzing the 
decedent’s intent, the same issues surface as in the intestacy context.  The 
only difference is that the donor has provided a written instrument that 
might give some indication of her intention.  When the donor’s intent is 
clear, it should be fully respected.177  However, such circumstances are 
rare.178 
When the gift is directly from the adoptive parent, it is evident that the 
donor intended to include the adult adoptee in the class.179  However, when 
the decedent is a third party, it is likely that the decedent was not even 
aware of the adoption.  This is true both because of the lack of notice-
requirements and because many of these cases arise with respect to bequests 
 
172  Rein, supra note 3, at 756. 
173  See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text. 
174  The potential difficulties raised by leaving this determination to the judiciary are discussed infra 
Part III.A. 
175  See supra Part II.B. 
176  See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 141–42 (Supp. 2011). 
177  Rein, supra note 3, at 732 (“When the transferor’s intent is clear from the instrument, or clearly 
shown by surrounding circumstances or other admissible extrinsic evidence, that intent should be 
honored.” (footnote omitted)). 
178  See id. (describing most instruments making a class gift as “totally unenlightening” with respect 
to the donor’s intent regarding adoptees). 
179  See Halbach, supra note 171, at 976. 
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distributed long after the donor has died.180  In fact, adult adoption may not 
have been legalized at the time the instrument was executed.181  Because 
many adult adoptions are used to solidify relationships other than ones that 
are parent–child in nature, it is probable that the testator did not anticipate 
such a relation to be included as a child or an heir when he executed the 
instrument. 
The UPC properly addresses these issues by refusing to consider the 
adult adoptee as a child of the adoptive parent in interpreting class gifts 
from parties other than the adoptive parent.182  In addition to adequately 
deducing the decedent’s intent, section 2-705 promotes the societal interest 
in maintaining legal and social stability and in protecting the credibility of 
the statutory scheme.  It also prevents any attempts to evade testamentary 
freedom, which is a fundamental tenet of estate law. 
Additionally, parties may use adoption to gain benefits beyond those 
intended for their substantive relationship, such as when a husband adopts 
his wife.183  State legislatures make a deliberate decision to confer certain 
benefits on specific types of relationships after considering the decedent’s 
probable intent and the policy considerations discussed above.184  A 
legislature’s statutory scheme with respect to these relationships should not 
be undermined by the use of adoption in a way that frustrates that plan.  
This issue may also arise in the same-sex-couple context, with the growing 
(albeit slowly) availability of same-sex marriage.185  Legislatures should 
avoid providing an incentive for couples to choose adoption over marriage 
by legalizing same-sex marriage and refusing to recognize benefits of an 
adult adoption that exceed those provided by marriage in cases where 
marriage more accurately embodies the relationship.  By prohibiting 
inclusion in class gifts, the UPC prevents adoption from being used as a 
manipulative tool. 
 
180  See Rein, supra note 3, at 751. 
181  Courts have used this fact to influence their decision in both directions.  See Rein, supra note 3, 
at 757–58.  In two California cases, the court denied adult adoptees inclusion in a class gift because the 
state had not legalized adult adoption at the time of execution.  Abramovic v. Brunken, 94 Cal. Rptr. 
303, 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Williams v. Ward, 93 Cal. Rptr. 107, 109–10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).  As 
per their reasoning, the testator could not have contemplated such a beneficiary if he was unaware that it 
was legally possible.  Brunken, 94 Cal. Rptr at 305; Ward, 93 Cal. Rptr, at 109–10.  In the Kansas case 
In re Estate of Fortney, however, the court held that the adoptee was included on the ground the 
decedent would have anticipated later changes in the law.  611 P.2d 599, 603 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980). 
182  See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 141–42 (Supp. 2011). 
183  See Bedinger v. Graybill’s Ex’r & Tr., 302 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1957). 
184  The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the intention of the legislature.  73 
AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 61 (2010).  In looking to the plain language of the statute first, courts presume 
that statutory language is the product of careful deliberation by the drafters.  See id. § 124. 
185  See Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.
nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/s/same_sex_marriage/index.html (last updated Aug. 25, 
2011) (reporting on the frequent developments in the same-sex marriage debate). 
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However, as was true in the intestacy context, there are some adult 
adoptions that serve to recognize true parent–child relationships.186  In those 
situations, public policy tends to support inclusion of the adoptee in the 
class gift as the natural child of the adoptive parent.  The UPC accounts for 
these cases by allowing the adult adoptee to be included in the gift when the 
adoptive parent is a stepparent, foster parent, or functioned as a parent 
before the adoptee turned eighteen years old.187 
This analysis not only supports the UPC approach, but also highlights 
the flaws in the common approach of states to give full discretion to the 
court to interpret the language of the will or dispositive instrument.  As in 
the intestacy context, courts are likely to interpret the lack of distinction 
provided by the legislature as an indication that all adoptees should be 
treated alike.  So instead of drawing a line between minors and adults, 
courts often draw distinctions on other improper grounds. 
Courts commonly attempt to determine the testator’s intent by 
distinguishing between those terms that are considered to have a legal 
connotation and those that are considered to have a bloodline connotation.188  
This arbitrary wordplay undermines the policy of treating even minor 
adoptees as natural children, since presumably they could also be denied 
inclusion in a class on the same grounds.  Additionally, it fails to consider 
the time that has lapsed since the document was executed and the precision 
with which the language was used, which may indicate that the connotation 
of the term was not considered by the decedent.189  Overall, it fails to 
provide the specific guidance necessary to ensure consistent application and 
can leave future testators uncertain about the implications of drafting legal 
instruments.  For these reasons, UPC section 2-705 more sufficiently 
reflects the decedent’s likely intent and sound public policy. 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the above analysis, it is clear that states should amend their 
statutes in order to most effectively comply with the decedent’s intent and 
to promote sound public policy.  At the same time, this narrow approach 
may cut off protection of valuable rights that might not otherwise be 
available to the parties involved.  This section sets forth a proposal for state 
intestacy and class gift provisions that more effectively embodies the goals 
of probate law and public policy than the current UPC provisions and 
explains why the approach should be adopted over another proposed 
 
186  See supra notes 17–21 (providing situations in which adoption recognizes a true parent–child 
relationship). 
187  § 2-705(f), 8 U.L.A. 141–42. 
188  See Rein, supra note 3, at 757. 
189  See Halbach, supra note 171, at 980 (“The draftsman is not likely to choose his language with an 
objective of producing a particular result with respect to this type of question, for if his attention were 
directed to this matter at the stage of drafting the question would not have been left unanswered.”). 
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strategy of handling these issues at the adoption phase.  Additionally, this 
section provides an alternative to adult adoption for preserving rights that 
might otherwise be denied. 
A. Proposed Statutory Provisions 
With respect to class gifts, UPC section 2-705 properly addresses the 
relevant policy considerations while respecting the donor’s intent.  State 
legislators should look to the UPC when drafting their class gift provisions 
to specifically account for adult adoptees when the transfer is not from the 
adoptive parent. 
In the intestacy context however, the UPC takes an overly broad 
approach.  Instead of adopting the UPC intestacy scheme verbatim, states 
should adopt the approach of section 2-705(f).190  This would allow the 
adult adoptee to inherit from the adoptive parent, but would limit the 
opportunity for the adoptee to inherit through the adoptive parent.  It would 
take into account those circumstances in which a parent–child relationship 
exists, allowing inheritance in those cases.  As discussed above, the relevant 
policy considerations and problems associated with decedent intent are 
nearly identical in both the class gift and intestacy contexts.  Adult adoptees 
should therefore be treated the same under both provisions. 
If adult adoptees are treated according to UPC section 2-705 for both 
class gifts and intestacy, the only potential obstacle is that the judiciary 
must address whether the adoptive parent “functioned as a parent.”191  One 
could argue that this is too subjective a determination to be made in the 
probate context and that it would create too large an administrative burden.  
However, the judiciary has proved itself equipped to make such 
determinations both in the adoption and inheritance contexts.192 In any 
event, the judiciary should take a narrow approach when utilizing section 2-
705(f)(3) and should limit its application to circumstances in which the 
parental functions of the adoptive parent are so visible that the judiciary’s 
investigative role is negligible.193  Only such a clear parent–child 
 
190  See § 2-705(f), 8 U.L.A. 141–42 (refusing to recognize an adult adoptee as the child of an 
adoptive parent for class gift transfers from third parties unless the adoptive parent was the adoptee’s 
stepparent, foster parent, or functional parent before the adoptee reached 18 years old). 
191  See id. § 2-705(f)(3), 8 U.L.A. 142. 
192  One example of this can be seen in the doctrine of equitable adoption, whereby the court treats 
an individual as an adoptee for inheritance purposes although a formal adoption never took place.  See 
Welch v. Wilson, 516 S.E.2d 35, 37–38 (W. Va. 1999) (allowing woman raised by her step-grandfather 
to inherit his estate based on evidence of a parent–child relationship). 
193  To reiterate, subsection 2-705(f)(3) states that an adult adoptee is considered a child of the 
adoptive parent for class gift purposes if the adoptive parent functioned as a parent before the adoptee 
reached 18 years old.  8 U.L.A. 142.  Some factors that are readily available for a court to consider 
include: “(1) the age at which the adoptee entered the adoptor’s home, (2) the length of time the adoptee 
lived there, (3) the length of time the adoptor actually supported the adoptee, and (4) the nature and 
extent of the parenting role assumed by the adoptor vis-á-vis the adoptee.”  Rein, supra note 3, at 765. 
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relationship would presumably affect the expectations of outside parties, 
specifically those parties who would be implicated in the intestacy and class 
gift contexts.  Thus, a narrow view is likely more consistent with decedent 
intent. 
B. The Adoption Phase 
Some argue that inheritance considerations should be addressed in the 
adoption-granting phase by requiring the court to consider the petitioners’ 
motivation for adoption and deny those adoptions whose primary purpose is 
to include the adoptee as a trust beneficiary.194  However, these estate-
specific issues surrounding adult adoption can more efficiently be resolved 
by clear and comprehensive intestacy and class gift statutes, such as the 
provisions suggested above.  This allows the court to avoid making a 
subjective evaluation of adoptive intent and prevents the invasiveness 
involved in determining the nature of such a relationship.195 
Particularly with regard to same-sex couples, the motivation behind an 
adult adoption will likely be multifaceted.196  It is, however, not in society’s 
best interest to withhold these benefits solely because an inheritance or 
class gift objective is included.  Instead, adult adoptions should be widely 
granted to ensure that these benefits remain available.197  By barring the 
inclusion in class gifts and intestate succession for such adoptions once 
granted, the proposed provisions will force the parties to weigh their 
motivations and drop the petition altogether if the sole purpose is to obtain 
an unintended right that would violate the principles of estate law. 
While same-sex marriage may be gaining momentum,198 until it is fully 
adopted there is a strong public policy interest in maintaining a mechanism 
by which gay and lesbian couples can reap at least some of the matrimonial 
advantages.  The relationship between the couple is similar to that of 
spouses, and it can be presumed that their intent with regard to their 
 
194  See McCabe, supra note 26, at 318. 
195  While it can be argued that the same type of subjective evaluation would be necessary to 
determine whether the adoptive parent “functioned as a parent” under subsection 2-705(f), the 
narrowness of the approach suggested will make it far less intrusive than the more extensive, and less 
defined, investigation proposed at the adoption phase.  For example, Brynne E. McCabe, a scholar that 
proposes an adoption-phase determination, outlines an extensive list of potential factors that includes 
sexual intimacy and the true intent of the settlor of a trust that a court “might consider” or “attempt to 
determine.”  See id. at 314–19. 
196  See supra Part I.C. 
197  See McCabe, supra note 26, at 317–18.  While McCabe suggests that adult adoptions for same-
sex couples should be freely granted based on the validity of their motivations, her approach may in fact 
chill attempts to bring such petitions for fear of the invasive nature of the adoption process under her 
model.  Additionally, placing the discretion to grant or deny such petitions in the hands of the judiciary 
gives too much leeway for judges to create their own policy considerations, decreasing the probability 
that those petitions will in fact be routinely granted. 
198  See Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, supra note 185. 
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benefits and rights toward each other follows the same pattern as married 
couples.  For those benefits that are used as substitutes for a will (e.g., life 
insurance, pensions, etc.), decedent intent should remain a priority.  If the 
couples have a way to legally enforce their relationships, it will ease 
administration and reduce the number of disputes among relatives that no 
longer have standing to challenge any will or will-like instruments.  
Additionally, providing access to health insurance, worker’s compensation, 
and other employee benefits will serve society as a whole by providing for 
dependent individuals that do not otherwise receive spousal support. 
C. An Alternative: Reciprocal Beneficiaries 
While there is a strong societal interest in allowing adult adoption, 
there are many drawbacks for the parties involved.199  However, without 
other options, same-sex couples may feel obligated to resort to adult 
adoption to block the possibility of collateral attack on their wills and to 
secure the transfer of one partner’s estate to the other.  Where same-sex 
marriage is legalized, adult adoption is unnecessary to preserve inheritance 
rights because the parties are treated as spouses under state law.200  
Additionally, in states where alternative relationships are recognized, such 
as civil unions or domestic partnerships, the disadvantages of adult adoption 
can be avoided if the legislature amends its probate statutes to either include 
parties to such a relationship under the definition of “spouse” or to at least 
list them as receiving spousal rights.201  This coincides with those states’ 
policies in favor of conferring spousal-type benefits without full inclusion 
in the marital institution. 
However, in states that do not recognize same-sex marriages, civil 
unions, or domestic partnerships, homosexual couples may feel forced into 
adult adoption as the only way to block their wills from collateral attack.  
This is also true in adult adoptions outside of the same-sex-couple context, 
where inheritance may be a driving force.  One alternative is to adopt a 
system of reciprocal beneficiaries, which allows two adults to designate 
 
199  See supra Part I.C.2. 
200  It is true that at the federal level, same-sex couples are still denied the benefits of marriage.  See, 
e.g., Annick Persinger, Note, Still Pioneers: Special Social and Economic Hardships for Elderly Gays 
and Lesbians, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 137, 143 (2010).  This is another reason why adult adoptions 
should be widely granted and is something that couples should consider when deciding whether to enter 
into an adult adoption.  However, because estate issues are generally a matter of state law, adult 
adoption will be unnecessary for the purpose of blocking collateral attacks and protecting inheritance 
plans if the couple weds in a state that recognizes same-sex marriage. 
201  The UPC supports such an approach, as explained in its revised note to Article II: “References to 
spouse or marriage appear throughout Article II.  States that recognize civil unions, domestic 
partnerships, or similar relationships between unmarried individuals should add appropriate language 
wherever such references or similar references appear.”  UNIF. PROBATE CODE Art. II, legislative note 
(amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 33–34 (Supp. 2011). 
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each other as beneficiaries not only for estate purposes, but also for access 
to other rights and benefits similar to marriage. 
Hawaii, by adopting the Hawaii Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act in 1997, 
serves as an example of such an approach.202  To register under the statute, 
parties sign a “declaration of reciprocal beneficiary relationship,” which 
must be notarized and filed with the Director of Health.203  Hawaii has 
adopted the UPC, and the amount that the beneficiary receives is 
determined in the same manner as the amount that a spouse receives.204  
Additionally, the designation is revocable; revocation triggers the same 
legal effects as divorce.205  Through this process, the parties receive the 
same intestacy and class gift benefits that marriage provides, without the 
potential stigma of adult adoption.206  Additionally, the approach remedies 
what is arguably the largest drawback of adult adoption—its irrevocability.  
It also ensures that inheritance rights from each party’s natural families are 
not severed, decreasing the problems of notice that arise with adult 
adoption.207 
Even in states that have decided not to recognize same-sex unions, a 
reciprocal beneficiary system may not violate public policy nor be against 
public sentiment.  The system does not distinguish between the sexes of the 
parties and does not include the same connotation as a marriage or civil 
union.  Hawaii itself has presented a strong opposition to gay marriage, 
passing a constitutional amendment in 1998 against the practice, yet its 
citizens have proved much more accepting of the reciprocal beneficiary 
system.208  One influential survey conducted in 1998 found that, while 
general sentiment was against gay marriage, “a substantial majority of the 
respondents . . . preferred the partner to take a share of the decedent’s 
estate,” and respondents “consistently preferred same-sex and opposite-sex 
committed couples be treated the same under the inheritance laws.”209  This 
shows that opposition to gay marriage can be compatible with recognizing 
certain rights for same-sex couples. 
 
202  See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-1 (2010). 
203  See id. § 572C-5. 
204  See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16 
LAW & INEQ. 1, 7 (1998). 
205  See § 572C-7. 
206  See id. § 560:1-201. 
207  See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text (noting that adult adoptees are not required to 
give notice to their relatives that might be affected). 
208  See Brian Burnette, Note, Hawaii’s Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act: An Effective Step in Resolving 
the Controversy Surrounding Same-Sex Marriage, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 81, 90 (1999); Kristin D. Shotwell, 
Note, The State Marriage Cases: Implications for Hawai’i’s Marriage Equality Debate in the Post-
Lawrence and Romer Era, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 653, 656–57 (2009). 
209  Fellows, et al., supra note 204, at 89. 
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On the other side of the debate, gay-rights activists argue that a 
reciprocal beneficiary system does not go far enough.210  While this may be 
true, a reciprocal beneficiary scheme may be the only viable option in a 
state like Hawaii where a constitutional amendment has been passed.211  
Even in states that have not taken such drastic measures, a register for 
reciprocal beneficiaries may be a step in the right direction by giving voters 
an opportunity to adjust to and accept the legal recognition of relationships 
between same-sex couples.212 
CONCLUSION 
Adult adoption is a widely used tool between both same-sex and 
opposite-sex couples.  While various motivations may underlie an adult 
adoption, it inevitably has implications for intestate succession and class 
gifts.  The UPC has taken the first step of treating adult adoptees differently 
in these contexts, but it must go one step further by eliminating the ability 
of adult adoptees to inherit through their adoptive parents. 
This is, of course, not to say that the benefits of adult adoption should 
be outright denied.  Instead, legislatures should grant adult adoptions 
broadly while clearly and explicitly addressing the rights that they provide 
under the state intestacy and class gift laws.  Additionally, until same-sex 
relationships are more widely recognized, legislatures should, at a 
minimum, consider the alternative of recognizing self-designated reciprocal 
beneficiaries to ensure the protection of these benefits. 
 
210  See, e.g., Let Me Reiterate: ‘Reciprocal Benefits’ Are a Joke, GAY RTS. WATCH (May 3, 2005, 
9:30 AM), http://www.gayrightswatch.com/2005/05/let-me-reiterate-reciprocal-benefits.html. 
211  See Burnette, supra note 208, at 86–87. 
212  See id. at 90. 
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